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E
very health system has to make decisions about
how to use limited resources to meet competing
claims about diverse health needs. In all systems,
national priority setting, including budgeting, generally
imposes constraints on other levels of decision-making 
be it in states or provinces, districts or cities, or local
health authorities, hospitals, or health insurance plans.
Decisions at any of these levels often are contested
because they create winners and losers, sometimes on
matters of life and death. Winners and losers have
conflicting interests and claims. What is worse, we lack
consensus on the distributive principles capable of
resolving disputes about who should get what (1).
Reasonable ethical disagreement thus surrounds these
conflicts of claims and interests. In addition, our
economic tools for resource allocation, such as cost-
effectiveness analysis have limited ethical acceptability,
for they may controversially push us to maximize
aggregate health benefits without adequate consideration
of the fairness of the distribution that results.
In the absence of agreement on principles or methods
that yield fair outcomes, we may need to develop a fair
process for decision-making and accept the outcomes of
such a process as legitimate and fair. This appeal to
procedural justice rather than a more substantive view
was the idea behind developing the fair, deliberative
process called ‘accountability for reasonableness’ (2) that
Steven Maluka writes about in his PhD thesis summar-
ized in a PhD review (3). The argument for relying on
such a process, however, is largely theoretical and is not
based on evidence that it will actually produce more
legitimate and fairer decisions (4). Although the theore-
tical arguments about why such a process may enhance
legitimacy and yield fair outcomes may be plausible, it
would be useful to see evidence that the process works
and makes things better. Indeed, such evidence is some-
thing health ministers usually ask for. Gathering such
evidence requires instances in which the process being
evaluated is implemented appropriately; only then can we
begin to assess whether it works. Indeed, having good
explanations of what difficulties of implementation face
the process is also an important area of investigation.
And that is what Maluka’s paper is about.
Maluka’s paper is one of few that focuses on decision-
making about health priorities in a low-income develop-
ing country (5, 6). It throws light on the difficulties facing
implementation of such aprocess, given the structural and
political realities of a country like Tanzania. Maluka’s
work, and the work of the multicountry EU-sponsored
REACT project he describes (7), examines the accept-
ability of accountability for reasonableness at the district
level. He finds that district-leveldecision-makers generally
approve of the idea of a more transparent, deliberative,
district-level process that includes a range of stakeholders
seeking grounds for the priorities they set.
Despite this acceptability of the ideas involved in the
fair process, the study finds significant obstacles at the
implementation level. Two key difficulties stand out,
namely the limited decision-space created by decentrali-
zation in Tanzania and the difficulties getting adequate
participation by relevant stakeholders in the process.
These difficulties are not unrelated. Tom Bossert has
studied decentralization in various countries and found it
to be a complex concept: the action or choice space that
devolves to lower levels of a system has multiple
dimensions, and some forms of decentralization give
true authority to lower levels while others do not (8, 9).
Maluka is clearly finding that Tanzanian decentralization
does not devolve full authority to set priorities at district
levels. In addition, lateness in delivering funds included in
budgets means further constraints on carrying out any
priorities that are set at the district level. It would be
interesting to use Bossert’s methodology to find in an
independent way the features of incomplete decentraliza-
tion that may be affecting the implementation of
accountability for reasonableness.
The other central difficulty derives from the many ways
there are to undercut a broad range of stakeholders and
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deliberation. Maluka points to the need to provide
adequate information to the stakeholders, and this is
part of a general problem that community-level stake-
holders often defer to those they see as having more
expertise. In addition, there are other problems: power
imbalances among the different participants may mean
that some stakeholders are intimidated out of making the
contribution they are capable of making. Maluka sug-
gests that empowerment be added as a further condition
on the process, as some others have proposed; for the
suggestion to address the problem, it would have to aim
for some form of equality in empowerment, otherwise
those who are more empowered than others will use their
power to distort the deliberation, perhaps converting it
into an unwanted form of lobbying.
The need to gather evidence about whether account-
ability for reasonableness improves the legitimacy or
fairness of outcomes has as a first step making sure cases
that purport to involve the process actually do. That is
still some distance from developing ways of measuring
legitimacy or of determining when decisions are fairer
than others, given the lack of a prior consensus on what
counts as a fair outcome. Maluka’s thesis is an important
early step that may help us accumulate cases in which we
can examine the impact of conformance more system-
atically and not rely on theoretical plausibility alone.
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